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‘Enacted in the destiny of sedentary peoples’: Racism, Discovery and the 
Grounds of Law. 
 
Peter Fitzpatrick 
Queen Mary and Westfield College 
University of London 
 
 
Whilst the racial, and racist, basis of the doctrine of discovery is a modern innovation, 
the doctrine owes much to its pre-modern forms and ethos. The finding and settlement 
of putatively unknown lands has long been attended with mythic and religious 
justification and with rituals of appropriation all of which strikingly resemble modern 
practice. Similarity in this case, however, serves to dramatize difference. What marks 
modern discovery of the occidental variety is the displacement of the mythic and 
religious by a combination of racism and legalism. The story of that displacement is 
told here along with an analysis of the poverty, not to say vacuity, of the doctrine of 
discovery as a justification for imperial appropriation. Since the story is told in 
broadly historical terms, its conception of the modern relies on the temporal ‘depth’ 
which historians usually attribute to this term, the discoveries of Columbus here 
providing something of a benchmark. But this account of the doctrine of discovery is 
not an antiquarian exercise, not a tale told in a now entirely discovered world, the 
unfolding of which may have had its reasons for regret but is now decidedly done 
with. Rather, this account is modern also in the sense of having current significance, 
of discovery’s still being an impelling force in the treatment of peoples supposedly 
once discovered and in the self-identity of those who would claim to have once 
discovered them, an identity which extends to the grounding of the discoverer’s law. 
Following the preponderant legal authority on discovery, my ‘case’ study here will 
come from the history of the United States. The parallels with the Australian situation 
are, it would seem, close. 
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Perhaps the most compendious point to be made about discovery in this present 
setting is that it involves something specifically more than the word’s ordinary 
meaning. What the word normally imports is the uncovering or the disclosure of what 
is already there. In this sense, the word is contrasted to invention, to the creation or 
inauguration of what was not already there. However, the prefix ‘dis-’ does have a 
privative force with its connotations of actively denying or undoing a previous 
condition. What this intimates for discovery is that the thing discovered is now 
different for having been discovered. It is now denied its ‘cover’ and put in a new 
scene, one pertaining to the discoverer. If this discoverer claims to be the repository 
of universal truth, a claim which modern discoverers invariably do make, then 
discovery in this extended sense can join with its primal meaning and the discovered 
be now revealed as what they should, in truth, be. 
This stretching of the semantic is given a more explicate force by the mythic 
renditions of discovery. With these, the act of discovery is equated with the deific 
creation, with a ‘transformation’ of what is discovered by endowing it with ‘forms 
and norms’ (Eliade 1965: 9-11). This mythic charge was encapsulated and made 
effective in possessory rituals. So, the almost paradigm planting of the Christian cross 
‘was equivalent to a justification and to the consecration of the new country, to a 
“new birth,” thus repeating baptism (act of Creation)’ (Eliade 1965: 11). What is 
more, the prior ‘undiscovered’ condition was comprehensively subordinated to this 
new dimension, a dimension in which the condition had now ‘become real’ (Eliade 
1965: 11). The seeming secular equivalent is captured in Diderot’s aptly fanciful 
account of Bougainville’s discovery of Tahiti (Diderot 1972). Here the French 
envelop a Tahiti that is but ‘a remote recess of our globe’. For Tahiti to be brought 
into the ambit of the Occident, for it to be quite overwhelmed by this ‘contact’ with 
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the French, it is enough for Bougainville to have touched the island and to have 
enacted there a ritual of appropriation - the erection of a plaque asserting ‘this land is 
ours’, described by Diderot’s ever-perspicacious Tahitian sage as the title ‘of our 
future slavery’. The encompassing, transforming effect of imperial discovery was 
then reassuringly confirmed by the ease with which savage cultures were supposedly 
subverted by it. Thus Bougainville’s visit brings about ‘the eclipse’ of a Tahitian 
society left in heavy expectation of what is to come (Diderot 1972: 147-8, 175, 178). 
This putative effect, along with the quasi-redemption of ‘contact’, echoed a prior 
religious doctrine conferring title to lands populated by infidels or pagans on their 
first Christian discoverer (Williams 1990: Part I).  
The transformation of discovery from a religious doctrine brought together hugely 
significant forces in the making of the modern Occident. Intriguing similarities with 
religious forms and justifications remained, but the search for a legitimating basis of 
discovery shifted from the papal and universal to the monarchical and national. A 
pointed significance attached to the technique of enquiry adopted by the Church for 
its government and taken over, as it were, by monarchical government through law: 
such enquiry extended to ‘a technique of travelling - a political enterprise of 
exercising power and an enterprise of curiosity and acquisition of knowledge - that 
ultimately led to the discovery of the Americas’ (Foucault 1996: 340). Thus 
Columbus relied on papal authority, religious rituals of appropriation, and redemptive 
invocation, but his claims to the land in the name of the Spanish Crown were taken to 
be valid only when legally authorized by that sovereign power. Furthermore, 
Columbus usually insisted on some legalistic recording of discovery by a notary. The 
rituals of appropriation themselves came to adopt a legal aspect. Thus, a 
contemporary royal instruction of Spanish origin directed that ‘acts of possession’ be 
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made ‘before a notary public and the greatest possible number of witnesses’; also, 
‘you shall make a gallows there, and have somebody bring a complaint before you, 
and as our captain and judge you shall pronounce upon and determine it’ (see 
Greenblatt 1991: 56). There was yet another momentous force at work, one intimated 
in the notorious distinction which Columbus drew between the peoples discovered, 
between those who were co-operative and thence virtuous and those who were 
resistant and utterly degraded, these being negatively rendered in the Spanish 
repertoire of ‘blood’ and race. For the considerable refinement of this division and its 
implanting in the modern doctrine of discovery, however, we have to move on just a 
few years to the contribution of Francisco de Vitoria. 
The ambivalence of Vitoria could hardly be more pronounced. He is almost 
invariably received as the benign humanist who erected a basic defence of Indian 
sovereignty and title to their lands and fathered international law. Yet in doing both 
these things he provided a consummate legitimation for one of the more spectacularly 
rapacious of imperial acquisitions. In his meditation On The Indians Recently 
Discovered, delivered as lectures in 1539, Vitoria went so far in elevating the Indian 
interest as to deny the validity of the title which Columbus claimed (Vitoria 1934 - 
published 1557). He reached this result by finding that natural law, in the form of a 
universalized ‘law of nations’, would only support title acquired by discovery where 
the lands discovered were deserted. This was not the case with any of the Spanish 
claims to the Americas. Indeed, for Vitoria the Indians already had that dominium -  a 
combination of sovereign and proprietary title - which in natural law attached to all 
‘men’. They were even similar to the Spanish in having families, hierarchical 
government, legal institutions, and something like religion. In all, the Indians had the 
accroutements of natural law and were participating subjects in that law.  
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Vitoria also managed, however, to arrive at  a contrary conclusion by relying 
on that same natural law. This infinitely amenable law also provided that the rights of 
the Indian peoples had to adjust to the expansive rights of all other people, including 
the Spanish, to travel, trade, ‘sojourn’ and, in the cause of Christianity, to proselytize. 
There was also something of a right to enforce natural law. These rights could not be 
aggressively asserted unless they were resisted by the Indians. When so resisted, 
however, they could be asserted to the full extent of conquest and dispossession. And 
so they were. This process was greatly facilitated by Vitoria’s deeming the Indians to 
be inherently recalcitrant. Although included initially within its universal embrace, 
Vitoria also found the Indian to be outside the range of natural law. The details of 
their utter deviance was even then quite standard, ranging from the instantly 
egregious, such as cannibalism and sexual perversion, to more picayune affronts to 
European taboos of diet and dress - nudity, consuming food raw, eating reptiles, and 
so on. 
This conflicting constitution of non-European peoples persisted in international law 
and eventually negated Vitoria’s ascribing dominium to them. What happened, in 
broad outline, was that international law became a matter of relations between 
sovereign states, and such sovereignty was intrinsically contrasted to certain 
uncivilized others excluded from participation in international law. From at least the 
late eighteenth century, the doctrine of discovery, now a tenet of international law, 
provided that full title was conferred on the sovereign state on whose behalf the 
discovery was made, and this was so even where the lands discovered were 
manifestly inhabited. The old doctrine that discovery conferred title only on deserted 
lands now segued with the new through the latter’s equating the chronic inadequacy 
of non-European occupation with the virtually deserted (Green 1989: 75). Reference 
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to the doctrine of discovery now became one of an indulgent exactitude. Apart from 
the hardly veiled racial ascription, the doctrine now lacked any palpable criterion of 
application. The civilized occidental discoverer assumed title on discovery of land 
occupied by the uncivilized, by those whose ‘uncertain occupancy’ cannot be ‘a real 
and lawful taking of possession’, as one leading authority put it with unabashed 
clarity (Vattel 1971: 44). The discovery still had to be marked and evidenced but the 
marking and the evidence were of discovery, not of adequate occupation. Although 
the discoverers’ justifications often advanced the superiority of their agriculture over 
nomadism or over inadequate cultivation, the quality of superiority attached to them 
and not to a more effective working of the lands discovered. But having discovered 
lands of allegedly ‘uncertain occupancy’, it was then ‘entirely lawful’ to occupy them 
(Vattel 1971: 44-5). 
In this blank apotheosis, the doctrine of discovery acquired its definitive version in 
the judgement of Chief Justice Marshall delivering the decision of the Supreme Court 
of the United States in the case of Johnson v. M’Intosh (1823), one of a distinct 
collection of so-called Indian cases which in the first half of the nineteenth century set 
the legal subordination of Indian peoples. As well as legally settling the doctrine and 
its effects for the United States, Marshall’s judgement became, as Williams puts it, 
‘accepted as the settled law on indigenous peoples’ rights and status in all the 
European-derived settler-colonialist states of the West’ (Williams 1990: 289), 
something confirmed with its effect in Mabo v. The State of Queensland (No 2) 
(1992).. Despite the range of its influence, the issues in this case, as Williams goes on 
to indicate, were quite specific to the settlement of the United States (Williams, 1990, 
p.289). But the case did basically pose a poignant issue which imported not only the 
whole modern history of the doctrine of discovery but also the insistent contradiction 
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at the core of occidental imperialism. The terms of the dispute, then, require some 
particular attention.  
On one side of this contest over title to certain frontier lands were settlers who, 
doubtless more out of convenience than conviction, asserted the rights of the Indians 
from whom they had derived the titles which they claimed. The Indians, just like 
those championed by Vitoria, were said to have had full transferable title to the lands 
acquired from them. Such a line of argument evoked, with excusable confidence, the 
credo of natural rights which inspired the revolution in the United States, and it 
placed some understandable emphasis on the right to property. The Declaration of 
Independence, to take a conspicuous instance, after invoking the cause of a specific 
‘people’, takes its impetus from certain self-evident truths and these are headed by 
one which has it ‘that all men are created equal’. And as Corwin has shown, the 
constitution of the United States is nothing less than a fusion of the sovereignty of a 
particular people with universal, natural rights enshrined in a transcendent legality 
(Corwin 1928).  
The other side in the case argued, in a distinctly counter-revolutionary mode, that 
the fullest possible title to the lands had, on the contrary, vested in the government of 
the United States as the successor to the British Crown, and the Crown in turn had 
acquired this title on discovery. It would follow from this that the Indians would not 
have had a transferable title. To sustain that line of argument a seeming denial of 
revolutionary universal assertion was invoked, a denial coeval with the assertion 
itself. The demiurge here is Locke who, so Corwin finds, ‘having transmuted the law 
of nature into the rights of men, … next coverts them into the rights of ownership’ 
(Corwin 1928: 391). Being natural rights they should of course inhere in all ‘men’. 
Necessary distinctions had to be drawn, however. Such rights could for Locke only be 
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fully enjoyed by those who enter into political society, the ‘Civiliz’d part of Mankind’ 
(Locke 1965: 331, 367 - paras. 30, 87). It is the entry into political society which 
secures ownership - secures the land: ‘The great and chief end therefore, of Mens 
uniting into Commonwealths, and putting themselves under Government, is the 
Preservation of their Property’ (Locke 1965: 395 - para. 124 - his emphasis). This 
blessed state was constitutively contrasted with the condition of those in the state of 
Nature who had an inadequately engaged relation to land: 
For I aske whether in the wild woods and uncultivated waste of America 
left to nature, without any improvement, tillage or husbandry, a thousand 
acres will yield the needy and wretched inhabitants as many conveniences 
of life as ten acres of equally fertile land doe in Devonshire where they 
are well cultivated? 
(Locke 1965: 336 - para. 37) 
 
Those who lacked as cultivators were, for Locke, lacking in reason also, and since 
reason was a necessary attribute of being ‘men’, the sufficiency of the Indian on that 
score had also to be doubted (Hulme 1990: 30). The existential hold which property 
had on the European by the late eighteenth century can hardly be exaggerated (see 
Fitzpartick 1992: 50, 82-4; and generally Davies 1998). Despite the breaking of the 
feudal ties to land, it was land which remained the paradigm of property (cf. Foucault 
1970: 199). At that time also, as well as into the nineteenth century, it was land which 
became the basis of new national territories, and this was territory now distinctively 
tied to law - to the law of the land. All of which civilized solidity was in the United 
States constituently  pitted against wildness and lack of attachment to land, seminally 
against ‘the merciless Indian savages’ conjured in the Declaration of Independence, 
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and thence used to found the appropriation of lands long settled by Indian peoples. 
Mere evidence of intensive agriculture on the part of Indian peoples, or indeed 
evidence of the great variety of their relations to land, was never allowed to disturb 
the attribution to them of a feckless nomadism. Nor could a landed relation changing 
in time ever dislodge an unchanging and ‘curious timelessness in defining the Indian 
proper’ (Berkhofer 1979: 28).  
 In an extended declamation, one of obscene eloquence, Marshall accepted that type 
of argument, but not without a constantly ambivalent regard for the argument on the 
other side. With characteristic insight, Carr hones the dilemma in this way: ‘These 
new Americans have defined their nation in terms of opposition to injustice, and of 
belief in inalienable natural rights; but they found that only by injustice and the 
alienation of rights could they bring their nation into being’ (Carr 1996: 9). As we 
will now see, the lines of this founding fracture and its putative resolution are 
delineated within the figure of ‘the Indian’.1   
The resonant confidence of Marshall’s judgement was more a compensation for the 
intractability of the issues in dispute than a reflection of felt certitude. From a 
sweeping survey of the practices of imperial states, from ‘the history of America, 
from its discovery to the present day’, from the remarkable consistency of the claims 
of its various colonizers, and from that immensely convenient international law based 
on the ‘usage’ of the imperial powers themselves, Marshall precipitately derived the 
view that discovery by the British had conferred on them an ‘absolute’ and 
‘exclusive’ title, one which not only ‘gave to the nation making the discovery the sole 
right of acquiring the soil from natives and establishing settlements upon it’, but one 
which also conferred on that nation the ‘right’ of consequent conquest (pp. 573, 586, 
590-1, 595). Without wishing to impugn the Court’s delicate impartiality in the 
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matter, it could be added that to have held otherwise may well have proved disastrous 
for the fledgling union of the United States, and it could also be added that the 
Court’s position in that scheme of things was itself far from secure (see Williams 
1990: 231, 306-8). There was, however, the inconvenience, not to say embarrassment, 
that such a decision ran counter to the impelling ideology of the ‘American’ 
revolution and its trumpeting of natural rights, pre-eminently the right to property. 
Appropriately, then, Marshall did recognize that Indian people had ‘natural rights’ in 
their land, and that this would include the right to transfer ownership (p. 563). 
Marshall sought to negate this right, and to resolve the conflict, by defaming the 
Indian people who held it. Thus Marshall found that they were ‘fierce savages … 
whose subsistence was drawn chiefly from the forest’ and to ‘leave them in 
possession of their country, was to leave the country a wilderness’ (p. 590). In the so-
called Indian cases generally, the grievous inability of Indian people to cover the land 
with furrow and fence was continually used judicially to find that their rights to land 
were less than resolved and hence inferior to the rights of the settler governments. 
Indian people were repeatedly and, for what it may be worth, inaccurately described 
as mere hunters who left the land ‘a wilderness’, and who would inevitably have to 
give way before agriculture and industriousness.2 In terms of the ancestor figures of 
international law, Vattel was much relied on judicially to support a necessary 
refinement. For Vattel, a nation may occupy territory not only when it is uninhabited 
but also when it is inadequately habited. ‘Merely … hunting, fishing and gathering 
wild fruits’ was a profligate use of land and ‘savages’ indulging in such means of 
subsistence can justly be restricted ‘within narrower bounds’ (see Green 1989: 74). 
Although some justices were prepared to go as far as adopting a full-blown version of 
the doctrine of terra nullius and treat Indian land ‘as if it had been vacant and 
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unoccupied’,3 Vattel’s contribution made this unnecessary. Crucially, it allowed some 
rights to the Indian peoples, indefinite as they may be, and those rights supported 
transfers and cessions of land which were made by them to settler governments.  
The usual judicial strategy, for neutralizing fixed natural rights involved a counter 
recourse to  natural progress. Indian people were typically seen to be in the 
inadequate ‘hunter state’ (hunting for many of them was more a consequence of being 
expelled from their agricultural land) and thus would have to give way before the 
‘advance’ of more adequate others to the agricultural state; that ‘would have a 
tendency to impair’ their natural right ‘and ultimately to destroy it altogether’. This 
outcome was, without more, inadequate because the Indian could still respond to the 
call of a universal humanity and advance, acquiring full(er) rights to their land and 
thus undermine the national settlement. Justice Johnson came close to completing the 
truth of it when he remarked that the Indians were ‘a race of hunters’ and ‘it is not 
easy to see how their advancement beyond that state of society could ever have been 
promoted, or, perhaps, permitted, consistently with the unquestioned rights of the 
States or United States, over the territory within their limits’. Wise and benign 
attempts to advance the Indians beyond the hunter state had been ‘altogether baffled’ 
by ‘their inveterate habits and deep seated enmity’.4 The judgements thence, are 
replete with the persistent and comprehensive inadequacy of the Indians, their 
wildness, lawlessness, cruelty, stupidity and so, considerably, on - the usual 
catalogue. 
The utility and ‘force’ of these designations can be brought more into view by 
looking a little more closely at the relative transparency of Marshall’s version. He sets 
it somewhat tentatively by saying that the ‘principles  which Europeans have applied 
to Indian title’ may be indefensible but ‘they may, we think, find some excuse, if not 
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justification, in the character and habits of the people whose rights have been wrested 
from them’ (p.588). There follows the unexceptional catalogue. The ‘actual condition’ 
of the Indian people was savage, degraded and recalcitrant, ‘the condition of a people 
with whom it was impossible to mix, and who could not be governed as a distinct 
entity’ (p.590). In that stunning synopsis, it was, then, the Indians’ own irresolute 
condition that led to the truncation and eventual elimination of the rights to their land. 
They could not be ‘mixed’ with, could not become the same and have the same rights 
as everyone else, but neither could they remain distinct and different, retaining their 
own natural and integral rights to the land.  
Marshall’s more refined deprecations did revealingly inhibit his resorting to 
another ground of appropriation in international law as readily as his more robust 
brethren. That was the ground of conquest. Their attenuated regard for historical 
accuracy enabled most justices to designate the British as ‘conquerors’ who thereby 
assumed a full ‘sovereignty’ to which the United States succeeded. Marshall, on the 
contrary, found that there had been no conquest by the European nations to whose 
rights the United States succeeded.6 For Marshall’s scheme of things, the distinction 
between discovery and conquest had to be maintained since, with conquest, the 
outcome is that ‘the conquered inhabitants can be blended with the conquerors or 
safely governed as a distinct people’ and, as we have just seen, they could be neither 
(pp. 589-90). 
All of which left Marshall with a double ambivalence. What was originally his 
‘excuse’ resolving one ambivalence and denying the Indian peoples their natural right 
to transfer property became a ‘principle’ sustaining the following ‘justification’: 
However this restriction may be opposed to natural right, and to the 
usages of civilized nations, yet if it be indispensable to that system under 
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which the country has been settled, and be adapted to the actual condition 
of the two people, it may perhaps be supported by reason, and certainly 
cannot be rejected by courts of justice (pp. 591-2). 
The overall effect, he recognized, was one of conquest - a conquest which neither had 
taken place nor, in his scheme, could be recognized as having taken place. Marshall 
resolved that further ambivalence in these terms: 
However extravagant the pretension of converting the discovery of an 
inhabited country into conquest may appear, if the principle has been 
asserted in the first instance, and afterwards sustained; if a country has 
been acquired and held under it; if the property of the great mass of the 
community originates in it, it becomes the law of the land and cannot be 
questioned (p. 591).  
In all, when allied to this pair of unprincipled ‘principles’, discovery initiates and 
maintains the asserted factuality of a primal acquisition of territory and its proprietal 
holding. These then provide the unquestionable ‘ground’ of law, of  ‘the law of the 
land’. On closer inspection, however, this seeming solidity is specifically lacking. 
Along with Marshall, it may be granted readily enough that law adapts to ‘the 
actual state of things’ but, when that adaptation does take place, its terms and the 
constitution of the actual state of things are matters of legal determination. What is 
involved here is a modernist legality delineated in the so-called Indian cases, most 
explicitly by Marshall. In setting his approach in Johnson v M’Intosh, Marshall saw 
that it would be necessary to examine not only ‘those principles of abstract justice, 
which the Creator of all things has impressed on the mind of his creature man, and 
which are admitted to regulate, in a great degree, the rights of civilized nations … but 
those principles also which our government had adopted in the particular case, and 
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given us as the rule for our decision’ (p. 572). The deific invocation was but a tribute 
absence pays to presence. This was, in terms of the Declaration of Independence, 
‘nature’s God’. The rights of nature doubtless extended to all humanity, and doubtless 
the commitment of the United States to natural rights was especially intense since 
natural rights were taken to have impelled the revolutionary struggle and to have been 
incorporated within the constitution, but Marshall elevated a law which, in its solitary 
sufficiency, could stand against and override such rights. In the end it became for 
Marshall solely the ‘government’ which has ‘given us… the rule for our decision’ 
(p.572). 
The dominance of law over nature and natural rights extended also to the whole new-
created world of fact. Much as the justices of the Supreme Court would render the 
seizing and holding of the land as the ground of law, they had to resort ‘originally’ to 
law in order to do so. The fact of discovery unadorned and the fact of settlement are 
cognitive perceptions and ‘ground’ nothing. To ground, and to found, there is in the 
so-called Indian cases a constant use of terms primally saturated in legality. So, 
discovery confers a ‘title’, one which is ‘absolute’, ‘exclusive’ and ‘ultimate’ (pp. 
574, 587-8, 592). No amount of plain discovery and settling can make the leap to the 
legal, - to entitlement, exclusivity, ultimacy, and such. Law has even to make good 
the lack of crucial factualities to which it must then dutifully adapt. For example, 
Marshall’s relatively scrupulous regard required him to recognize, as we saw that 
conquest had not taken place, that in his scheme of things it could not be accepted as 
having taken place, and that discovery was decidedly not conquest; yet discovery had 
to be converted to conquest no matter how ‘extravagant the pretension’ (p. 591). 
Even when attempting to exempt the law and themselves from the ‘savagery’ of a 
founding violence, the justices succeed in nothing so much as intractably implicating 
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themselves and the law in it. One of the ‘Indian cases’ can also illustrate the point 
with a dismal clarity. There is as well something integral to that violence which the 
case can illustrate, and that is the law’s most significant invention of fact in these 
cases - the ‘fiction’ of the Indian. In Cherokee Nation v. Georgia (1831), the 
Cherokee sought redress against a depredatory State of Georgia. To gain access to the 
national legal system they sought to rely on the constitutional provision whereby the 
original jurisdiction of the Federal Courts extended ‘to controversies … between a 
State, or the citizens thereof, and foreign states, citizens or subjects’.8 Indian tribes 
were held not to be ‘foreign states’ within that clause and the Cherokee were thus 
denied relief on a jurisdictional basis.  I will return to that exact finding and its 
designation of Indian peoples shortly, after dealing first with the ground of law. In 
dealing with this ground, some reliance will be placed also on other so-called Indian 
cases, especially Marshall’s engagement with discovery in Johnson v M’Intosh. 
The judicial movement here is one from law’s ensuing from overwhelming fact to 
that fact’s being overwhelmed by law. It was certainly not an understatement for 
Marshall to say of the plight of the Indian people revealed in Cherokee Nation v. 
Georgia that ‘if the courts were permitted to indulge their sympathies, a case better 
calculated to excite them can scarcely be imagined’. A people ‘sinking beneath our 
superior policy, our arts and our arms’ are left with but a ‘remnant’ of their land. That 
remnant was now to be taken from them through a massive violence and fraudulently 
enacted law of the State of Georgia. But to do anything about all this, according to 
Marshall, ‘savours too much of the exercise of political power to be within the proper 
province of the judicial department’; ‘this is not the tribunal which can redress the 
past or prevent the future’.9 Justice Johnson found the situation apt only for an 
‘appeal… to the sword and to Almighty justice, and not to courts of law or equity’.10 
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The law of the land, to borrow his phrase, could not for Marshall question the 
‘momentous’ national settlement which gave it being; that outcome ‘is not now to be 
disturbed’.11 This self-denying ordinance, on closer inspection, proves to be 
something more than a simple giving way to overpowering fact which thence sets 
insuperable bounds to law. So, for Marshall, ‘it is not for the courts of the country to 
question the validity of this title’ derived from ‘the sword’, and the ‘rights’ given by 
‘power, war, conquest… can never be controverted by those on whom they 
descend’.12 Likewise for Johnson, ‘it cannot be questioned that the right of 
sovereignty, as well as soil, was notoriously asserted and exercised by the European 
discoverers. From that source we derive our rights…’.13  That which most 
immediately must not be questioned or controverted is law’s self-constituting origin - 
an origin replete with legal matter, with the question of validity, with rights and right. 
Nor will law rest restrained and content on the consequential side of the origin but 
will, rather, shape and make the facts supposedly impelling its own originary matter. 
We have already instanced Marshall’s ‘extravagant pretension’ of conquest. Another 
example would be his attributing the ‘right… to prescribe those rules by which 
property may be acquired and preserved’ to ‘society’ conceived of as ‘the nation’; this 
right too ‘cannot be drawn into question’ (p. 572). (Sovereign right in all these cases 
and invariably put in national terms.) Yet Marshall derived the social and national 
origin of right and law by going beyond the national society and placing its 
determinant effect within international law in such terms as discovery and effective 
occupation.14  
The über fiction through which law created and sustained both its factual ground 
and its self-entitling was the figure of the Indian. A stark instance of the making and 
use of this fiction can be isolated by continuing the story of discovery in Johnson v 
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M’Intosh. After doing that, I will return to Cherokee Nation v Georgia and its 
inglorious contribution to the constitution of the Indian. 
Summary can serve to emphasise the overweening quality of the claims made in the 
name of discovery. Not only did the discoverers acquire ‘absolute’ and ‘exclusive’ 
title to the land, not only did discovery thence give them ‘the exclusive right… to 
appropriate the lands occupied by the Indians’, they also ‘asserted the ultimate 
dominion to be in themselves’ (p. 574). Bluntly, the discoverers were the kind of 
people who had sovereignty and title, and the discovered were the kind of people  
who had neither. Unlike Vitoria’s involving natural law which recognized something 
like sovereignty vested in them, the Indians were now utterly subordinate to a 
sovereign power and were ‘excluded… from intercourse with any European potentate 
than the first discoverer’ (p. 573). Indian people had no operative participation in the 
doctrine as a mode of legal determination nor any part in the constitution of the truth 
discovered. The active purpose Marshall attributes to it is ‘to avoid conflicting 
settlements, and consequent war’ between ‘European potentates’ (p. 573). Such a 
purpose produced a telling hiatus in the doctrine of discovery itself. This is intimated 
in a disparity barely hidden within Marshall’s statement of the ‘principle’ of 
discovery in this setting of inter-imperial rivalry: 
This principle was that discovery gave title to the government by whose 
subjects, or by whose authority, it was made, against all other European 
governments, which title might be consummated by possession (p.573).  
 
But this title, as we have just seen, was one of an ultimate and absolute kind and 
hardly required ‘consummation’. Sovereignty and proprietary title, and the very 
ground of law, are thus revealed as existent and integral only in their contrary relation 
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to the discovered Indian. When, however, there are competing claims to discovered 
territory between the exemplars of transcendent sovereignty and property, such 
elevated attributes degenerate to a drab ‘effectiveness’, the test of effectiveness 
having been promoted in international law to decide between such competing claims, 
among other things (Shearer, 1994, pp.145-8). Effectiveness here is equivalent to 
Marshall’s ‘possession’ and connotes the ability to ‘hold down’ territory, to deal with 
disruption from within or from without. In a feat of legal legerdemain, this 
requirement came in the nineteenth century to be reconciled sotto voce with instant 
and full title as against the discovered by the invention of ‘inchoate title’. As against 
other civilized ‘European’ sovereign powers, however, the initial title had to be, in 
Marshall’s term, ‘consummated’ by effective occupation.15
Returning to Cherokee Nation v Georgia, we find that this case served to put in 
enduring terms the attributes of the Indian which Marshall advanced in Johnson to 
deny Indian people sovereignty and any secure title to their lands. The straitened 
discoverers in Johnson had to acquire title and sovereignty because of ‘the condition 
of a people’ who could neither be a ‘distinct’ nation, nor ‘mix’ with the settlers on the 
basis of parity (p.590). As a distinct nation they would retain title to their lands and as 
mixed they would retain their natural rights of property. In Cherokee,  Marshall found 
that the tribe had some distinctness, it was ‘capable of managing its own affairs and 
governing itself’, but not enough, because the Cherokee also were a ‘domestic 
dependent nation’ which ‘looked to our government for protection’ in ‘its kindness 
and its power’ as would a ‘ward’ or someone in a ‘state of pupillage’: 
They and their country are considered by foreign nations, as well as by 
ourselves, as being so completely under the sovereignty and dominion of 
the United states, that any attempt to acquire their lands, or to form a 
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political connection with them, would be considered by all as an invasion 
of our territory, and an act of hostility. 
 
That ‘the Indian Territory is admitted to compose part of the United States’ cannot be 
gainsaid because, as Marshall observed, ‘in all our maps, geographical treaties, 
histories and laws, it is so considered’.16 With such a threadbare positivism, we see 
law not so much simply inventing the factuality of its ground as aptly choosing one 
‘fact’ rather than another. Here, the pervasive truth of ‘our maps, geographical 
treaties’ and so on or, in Johnson, Marshall’s acceptantly accommodating the vast, 
rapacious range of European imperial history can enter as grounding matter, whereas 
a scrupulous legal formalism prevented any response to the murderous savagery of 
the State of Georgia. That the choice could have been otherwise is indicated by the 
remarkable and painstaking dissent of Justice Thompson in the Cherokee case. He 
found ‘that the Cherokees compose a foreign State within the sense and meaning of 
the Constitution, and constitute a competent party to maintain a suit against the State 
of Georgia’. His main reason for so holding was that ‘civilization and the 
establishment of a regular government’ had ‘been accomplished’ by the Cherokee 
people. Indeed, constitutionally and legally, the Cherokee people had successfully 
adopted a model close to that of the United States itself. The offending laws of the 
State of Georgia were explicitly directed against that ‘accomplishment’: ‘the laws of 
Georgia set out in the bill, if carried fully into operation, go the length of abrogating 
all of the laws of the Cherokees, abolishing their government, and entirely subverting 
their national character’.17
In another way, however, that choice was not an available one. The national 
settlement, as Marshall uneasily recognized, was founded on the Indian’s having that 
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contradictory duality of attributes, on being dependent yet independent and on being 
included yet excluded, which Thompson’s singular and liberating finding would deny. 
What was especially dangerous about Justice Thompson was that he considered 
Indian people to be human, most significantly in their capacity to change. The 
national settlement, and along with it the ground of law, depended not just on the 
Indian’s having once had the contradictory attributes but also on the Indian’s forever 
having them, something which Justice Johnson recognized in Cherokee when he 
opined that ‘it is not easy to see how their advancement beyond that [hunting] state of 
society could ever have been promoted, or, perhaps, permitted, consistently with the 
unquestioned rights of the States or United States, over the territory within their 
limits’.18 These ‘unquestioned’ rights are also unquestionable. They cannot, as we 
have seen, be ‘questioned’, they can ‘never be controverted’, and they are ‘not now to 
be disturbed’.19 So much is obvious for what preceded the national settlement or, more 
exactly, for that massively retrojected factuality or fantasy which would necessitate 
the Indian’s then being uniformly nomadic, hunting, conquered, incapable of 
independence yet unable to mix with the settler, and so on. What is less obvious, but 
still has disturbing force, is the prospect following on the national settlement of 
change in its constituent conditions. What if the Indian soon after proves 
conspicuously capable of independence, and not only that, but assumes independence 
in the same ‘civilized’ terms as those espoused by the settler, all of which Justice 
Thompson readily perceived in Cherokee Nation v Georgia? What if the Indian 
follows another ‘civilized’ route and proves capable of mixing with the settler? 
‘Permitting’ such things, to use Justice Johnson’s term, would be at least to disturb 
the settlement based on their absence. 
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Marshall’s notion of wardship could be taken as both a symptom of this problem 
and a telling failure to resolve it. As with many colonial situations, the land or 
territory of the indigenous people is said to be held in trust for them pending their 
advance. That advance somehow never comes. Like the ravages of those other 
colonial powers, trusteeship was in the United States used to justify what would 
otherwise have resembled fraud and theft less equivocally. Amongst the types of 
controls the United States found necessary to protect its charges, the disposition of 
land was of some importance. The federal government as trustee - a trustee not held 
by the courts to the exacting standards of its private law counterparts - could and did 
readily dispose of Indian land as the act of the Indian people themselves (Shattuck 
and Norgren 1991: 115-21). There was little restraining the trustees in the relationship 
since the courts assumed a sufficient protection in that ‘the United States would be 
governed by such considerations of justice as would control a Christian people in 
their treatment of an ignorant and dependent race’.20 This corresponded to an 
influential view in international law at the time that any rights of the colonized are 
best left to the benign dispensation of the colonist (Westlake 1971: 50-1). The terms 
of advance and the determination of their achievement are always reserved to the 
settler (Carillo 1995; Torres and Milun 1995).  
That prerogative is made effective in a power of comprehensive regulation over 
Indian peoples liberally bestowed on Congress by a Supreme Court with scant 
constitutional justification, a power indistinguishable in its terms and exercise from 
that used by more forthright contemporary colonial rulers.21 Such a power of 
comprehensive regulation was obviously requisite if the Indian had to be 
contradictorily included and excluded, and so could have no settled expectation, no 
enduring basis for an informed and voluntary adherence. As far as Indian people are 
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concerned, we are dealing here not so much with a constitutional settlement as with 
‘constitutional unsettlement’ (cf. Foley 1989: chapter 5). This active ambivalence has 
since been sustained, ranging from the alternation in the later nineteenth century 
between ‘reform’ aimed at ‘assimilation’ and ‘treatment’ as different, to the current 
divide between ‘self-government’ and ‘termination policy’, a sensitively titled variant 
of assimilation.  
The enduring ambivalence of the Indian, the impossibility ‘of coming to terms’ 
with the settler, can be confirmed in the constant lamentations about the incoherence 
and inconsistency of ‘Indian law’ or, more immediately, in the long lines of cases 
which successively defy resolution yet repeatedly insist on it. (Wunder 1994: 3-4; 
Frickey 1994: 418; Harring 1994: 4). Ruling perceptions of that same Indian law 
perversely indicate its significance. So, in line with the occidental strategy of 
marginalizing the foundational, we have Wunder’s remarking that the ‘dominant 
society’ often classifies ‘Indian disputes as obscure and inconsequential’ (Wunder 
1994: 3-4). In the same vein, Frickey has assembled a catalogue of epithets directed at 
‘federal Indian law cases by [Supreme Court] Justices themselves’, these august 
authorities describing such cases as ‘crud’ and ‘peewee’ cases, and worse (Frickey 
1993: 383). Another indication of perilous marginality: Friedman’s greatly influential 
A History of American Law devotes but a few words to Indian peoples (Friedman 
1973: 443-4). All of which attests to the potency of the insignificant. The Indian cases 
were, and are, the legal equivalent of Durham’s judgement that: 
 
Nothing could be more central to American reality than the relationships 
between Americans and American Indians, yet those relationships are of 
course the most invisible and the most lied about. The lies are not simply 
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a denial; they constitute a new world, the world in which American 
culture is located. 
(Durham 1993: 138) 
In sum, what is ‘enacted in the destiny of sedentary peoples’ and made operative 
through their discoveries is a universal becoming which allows of no truth ‘besides’ 
itself, and which can only subordinate those who prove to be outside of its inevitable 
instanciation.22  Although for Australia the claims of the discoverers and settlers to 
surpassing truth and entitlement may be less grandiloquent than those made for the 
United States, they are nonetheless of the same kind, and just as effectively sustained 
(cf. Motha 1999). Doubtless there were and remain significant differences, not the 
least of which must be the even more draconic impact of this truth and entitlement on 
indigenous peoples in Australia. 
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ENDNOTES 
 
 1. The irresolution thus transferred to the Indian can be aptly extracted from 
the Declaration’s main author, Thomas Jefferson, who equivocated between 
positioning the Indian as utterly different to the European and as the same, at least 
potentially (e.g. Carr 1996: 33; Wills 1980: 304). 
 23
 2. E.g. Cherokee Nation v Georgia at 23 and United States v Forty-Three 
Gallons of Whiskey at 196. 
 3. Chief Justice Taney in United States v Rogers at 572. 
 4. The quotations in this paragraph come from Cherokee Nation v Georgia at 
23-4; cf. however Marshall in Johnson v M’Intosh at 588. 
 5. E.g. Justice Johnson in Cherokee Nation v Georgia at 23-6. 
 6. Worcester v Georgia at 544-5. 
 7. For such ‘savagery’ and its intrinsic relation to law, see Derrida (1992: 40). 
 8. Art III, s. 2, ch. 1. That jurisdiction is now broader. 
 9. Cherokee Nation v Georgia at 15. 
 10. Ibid. at 52. 
 11. Marshall in Fletcher v Peck at 142. 
 12. Johnson v M’Intosh at 572 and Worcester v Georgia at 543. 
 13. Cherokee Nation v Georgia at 22. 
 14. Occupation and effectiveness are considered shortly when coming to the 
issue of inchoate title. See also Marshall in Worcester v Georgia at 543. 
 15. The definitive authority is now taken to be Re Island of Palmas 
Arbitration (1928). 
 16. Cherokee Nation v Georgia at 16-18. 
 17. Ibid. at 72, 75, 80. 
 18. Ibid. at 23 (emphasis added). 
 19. Johnson v M’Intosh at 588-9, Worcester v Georgia at 543 and Fletcher v 
Peck at 142. 
 20. Beecher v Wetherby at 525-6. 
 21. United States v Forty-Three Gallons of Whiskey at 194. 
 24
 22. The quotation and its linking to universal becoming are taken from 
Levinas (1979: 46). 
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